sion in a timely manner in order to be
able to bring to bear the full power of
the Marine air-ground task force
(MAGTF) where and when he needs
it. If he cannot, the lurking specter of
tactical defeat may well become a disastrous reality.
Unfortunately, today’s Marines at
the small team level lack the trust and
authority to employ the full weight of
the MAGTF—even when they are in
contact with the enemy. Due to existing rules of engagement and localized
command restrictions, Marines and
sailors are placed in the uncomfortable
position of relying on commanders
who reside at much higher levels and
are often significantly removed from
the tactical situation to authorize the
employment of supporting arms. DO
doctrine posits that small teams will be
able to utilize supporting arms as the
decisive combat multiplier to dominate
the enemy and counter his attacks.
Further, it states that the increased operational tempo created by decentralized decisionmaking at the lowest level
will create an insoluble dilemma for the
enemy. Unfortunately, if the leaders at
the lowest level are neither empowered
nor trusted with the authority to employ the full spectrum of fires, they face
domination and destruction by a foe
that is able to establish a local superiority that the small team may not be able
to rebuff.
Further muddying the waters are
the instances that lead to increased
scrutiny of decisions and additional restrictions placed on leaders at all levels.
Incidents such as those in Haditha,
Hamidiya, and the Marine special operations engagement in Afghanistan
serve to add further restrictions on subordinate leaders. They certainly do not
result in a loosening of the reins; violations of the law of war create uncertainty, and uncertainty leads to a
restriction on the amount of trust that
can be meted out to junior leaders.
When something bad happens, the
first reaction is to find out what caused
it and to make sure that it never occurs
again. The result is usually the levying
of more restrictions and increased cen-
tralization of control, which in turn reduces uncertainty by removing some of
the latitude previously enjoyed by junior leadership.
Our technology, which can be used
to give commanders at all levels greater
situational awareness of the battlespace,
has become an obstacle to decisiveness
in its own right. Instead of allowing the
leader at the point of friction to make
the decision for kinetic engagements
based on the tactical situation, employment of supporting arms for troops in
contact situations has been significantly slowed or denied on many occasions because commanders at the level
empowered to make kinetic decisions
make them based on the video feed (or
lack thereof) transmitted by an unmanned aircraft system and the fragmentary reports presented by a
Is the Marine Corps
ready for DO?
well-meaning staff. It is human nature;
if a leader at the colonel level is required to authorize a kinetic strike,
then he will want to know why he is
being asked to do so. This usually results in a flurry of activity in the operations center and a series of questions
up and down the chain of command in
order to determine if the strike meets
the commander’s criteria for execution.
As the decisionmaker who is authorized to employ supporting arms garners the information necessary to make
the call, things continue to heat up at
the point of friction. If the kill chain is
such that decisionmakers at multiple
levels must pass the request higher and
higher until someone is capable of
pulling the trigger, the heat may become unbearable for the team that
called for and needs the fires, or the target set may vanish, giving the enemy
another day to fight.
DO requires unfettered leaders at all
levels who are empowered to make the
decisions necessary to leverage the
strengths of the MAGTF over the
enemy. Restrictive rules of engagement
and command directives are anathema
to such a concept, as they serve to restrict the autonomy of leaders at lower
levels. Can a squad leader in contact
with the enemy have his platoon commander authorize the employment of
supporting arms? Currently, the answer
is almost always no. He must ask his
platoon commander, who must ask his
company commander, who must ask
his battalion commander, who must
ask his regimental commander. As the
request rises through each level, a bit of
the tactical urgency is mitigated and a
bit of uncertainty creeps in. By the
time the request has made it through
the wickets, the crucial advantage of
time has been lost, and the initiative
may well have passed to the enemy. At
most, the squad leader should have to
ask his platoon commander for approval. To have to wait for the regimental commander’s decision to employ
ordnance costs him, at a minimum, the
synergy created by aggressive action
and combined arms and, at the maximum, the very real possibility of
friendly casualties.
Is the Marine Corps ready for DO?
Until the restrictions of rules of engagement and employment of supporting
arms are reconciled with the autonomy
of decisionmaking required for such
doctrine, the answer is not yet. The
Marine Corps has the tools and
Marines have the talent, but for DO to
become more than a theoretical
methodology for future warfare it will
require that leaders at the lowest levels
be entrusted with both the ability to
employ supporting arms as well as the
authority to do so. Capability and authority together will prove unstoppable, and the key to their happy
marriage is endowing the leadership
principle of trust on leaders at all levels.
Without trust, however, we trade away
the advantages of tempo, leveraging
supporting arms, and flexibility, and
give the enemy the opportunity to
strike more small teams of Marines
from the friendly order of battle.
