a naval special operations forces (NavSOF)
unit, but its participation depended on C2
relationships and approval from the Joint
Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) in
Bagram.
Initially Marine, ANA, and NavSOF
planners agreed to allow the battalion to
control all participating units. When these
plans went to higher headquarters for approval, the JSOTF would not approve a
conventional force in command of any
special operations unit. Although the concept was tactically sound, based on joint
doctrine, and desired by the units executing
the mission, the JSOTF was adamant that
no special operations units would be allowed to be under the control of any conventional force. This unofficial policy
eventually led to problems that would be
compounded. 3
The command relationship that was
agreed to and approved allowed NavSOF
to conduct independent operations separated by space from all other units in the
area until they completed their part in the
operation. Marines in their area would
come under NavSOF control temporarily
while conducting a relief in place. The plan
was approved but did not adhere to the
principle of unity of command. “Unity of
Command means that all forces operate
under a single commander [with] the requisite authority to direct all forces em-
ployed in the pursuit of a common purpose.” 4 Recognizing that this relationship
was not optimal and could lead to problems, a JSOTF liaison team was collocated
in the battalion command post in Jalal
Abad. Employment of this liaison team attempted to justify and work around the
failure to adhere to unity of command.
Additionally, the authority and responsibilities of this liaison team were never identified to them or us.
Operation RED WINGS began on or
about 27 June 2005 and was a combined
forces operation. Operation RED WINGS
lasted 1 week and ended in the compromise of the NavSOF team and the eventual downing by rocket propelled grenade
fire of an MH– 47 with 16 personnel
aboard. This crash immediately caused the
staff to conduct rapid staff planning and
develop Operation RED WINGS II as a sequel. Operation RED WINGS II lasted approximately 2 weeks and was successful in
disrupting the ACM’s ability to operate
freely within the province while simultaneously supporting the efforts to conduct the
recovery of the remains of the personnel.
RED WINGS II Operations
Within hours of being inserted and during daylight hours, the reconnaissance element reported contact with a request for
help. No location or specifics were given
Coordination of fires and movement of forces by air was unwieldy, time consuming, and cumbersome. (Photo
courtesy of Ed Darack.)
before the transmission stopped. Immediately the SOF liaison cell convened crisis
action planning with NavSOF, Marine, and
conventional aviation representatives present. The recommended solution requested
JSOTF aviation to take additional NavSOF
into the immediate vicinity of the suspected location while Marines, with conventional aviation, concentrated efforts to
the south. Apache support would be provided for both recovery forces. C2 would
be executed from the Marine combat operations center (COC) with the liaison element controlling the NavSOF efforts and
the Marines controlling the Marine effort.
The rules for engagement and criteria for
landing were agreed to. The JSOTF approved of this plan, but this concept again
failed to follow joint doctrine. The composition of forces was designed for the best
chance of success, but the C2 was not. The
plan called for two separate forces, flying
on aircraft from two separate units and geographical locations, supported by Apache
helicopters from another unit with no relationship between forces and no one commander with authority over all forces. The
JSOTF would not place forces under Marine C2, and they did not have the capability to execute effective C2 over forces larger
than their own.
As the NavSOF recovery element arrived in the vicinity of the reconnaissance
team, one of the recovery force aircraft
was shot down. Complete knowledge of
events and decisions that led to the catastrophe will never be known. What is
known is that the reinforcing NavSOF element did not wait for Apache escort and
made a decision to attempt an insertion in
what must have been perceived as an urgent requirement for support by the reconnaissance element in contact with enemy
forces. Because the weapon used to shoot
the helicopter was unknown, all aircraft
and airborne units returned to their respective bases until another recovery plan was
prepared. C2 cannot be directly blamed for
this catastrophe, but it did compound the
situation. The force that was shot down
was directed, in planning, not to land unless the lives of the reconnaissance force
necessitated immediate support. It can
only be surmised that the need to land was
evident. The NavSOF recovery element
