Marine Corps Gazette

IDEAS & ISSUES (PLANNING)

for more than a decade; therefore, commanders and planners should already be familiar with problem framing even if the operating environment is more “wicked” than in the past.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication
1-0, Operations, states that the:
. . . visualization of the environment
and an understanding of the intended
actions of both the enemy and the
friendly force is a continuous process
that requires the commander to un-
derstand the current situation, broadly
define his desired future situation, and
determine the necessary actions to
bring about the desired end state. 11

Furthermore, designing innovative and
bold plans is already integral to the
planning process. The U.S. Army’s
MDMP articulates this when it states
that:
. . . bold plans go beyond the usual
limits of conventional thought or ac-
tion to mass the effects of overwhelm-
ing combat power at the decisive place
and time . . . . Commanders design
bold plans that allow them to initiate
combat on their own terms and seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative. 12

U.S. Marine Corps and Army planning doctrine acknowledges that there is complexity in combat and introduces the requirement for bold, innovative methodologies that transcend conventional thought. While systemic thinking and the conceptual design of operations is the topic du jour, they do not introduce anything new. More importantly, the complexity being experienced today on the contemporary battlefields is nothing new. War has always been made up of chaos, friction, and the fog of war—a complex clash of competing wills. Our current doctrinal planning processes are already structured to conform to these complexities. Therefore doctrine found in MCPP and MDMP need not be changed but rather stringently enforced by commanders and ardently adhered to by planners.

While the SAMS student text, commanders’ appreciation and campaign design, systemic thinking, operational design theory, and the like are valid,

highly pertinent, and critical concepts that bolster existing planning processes (because they are inherent and integral parts to existing processes themselves), they should not be launching points for deleting or adding steps to the MCPP or MDMP. Gaining a better understanding of the situation and framing the problem in the midst of a wicked environment can be evaluated in a myriad of ways. Current U.S. military doctrine approaches design through PMESII (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information systems), DIME ( diplomatic, informational, military, economic), or METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations) depending on the level of command conducting planning. Another lens with merit through which commanders and planners can evaluate the problem is using logical lines of operations or the five cultural dimensions used in ethnographic studies (physical environment, economy, social structures, political structures, and belief systems). These methods are also not “new” concepts. These constructs have been assisting commanders with their battlefield appreciation or visualization process for years. Thus, all of these new planning paradigms, which are components of existing planning processes, merely need to be cultivated better, nurtured more passionately, and applied more stringently by commanders and staffs. That’s how commanders and planners should attack the wicked problems of current and future conflict.