Marine Corps Gazette

ered with maneuver and cannot be elevated to such a level that strategic, operational, and tactical mobility is sacrificed. The Marine Corps Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy aims to achieve this balance.

5. Wood, Dakota L., “Strategy for the Long Haul: The U.S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Forces for the 21st Century,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment Report 2008, pp. 58–65.

6. Gates, p. 4.

Conclusion

Provided full funding and support to accomplish the required testing and continued development, the EFV program will continue on this restructured path to successfully field the system. The program will continue to advance the design along the established reliability growth curve and deliver a vehicle at initial operational capability that will provide the enhanced general support lift capability to the MAGTF, ensuring freedom of movement and action across the range of military operations and enabling the core competencies that make our Service unique. From a forward naval presence, during maneuver operations from the sea, and during sustained operations ashore in the world’s littoral regions, the EFV will fulfill a critical capability in keeping the Marine Corps the Nation’s “force in readiness.”

7. Akst, George and David Brenner, Advanced Amphibious Assault Program COEA, Center for Naval Analyses, 1990, updated 1993, 1994.

8. United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Studies and Analysis Division, AoA, Advanced Amphibious Assault Program, Quantico, 2000, updated during 2006–07 Nunn-McCurdy Congressional Certification.

11. Survivability figures represent a general comparison of known standard armor protection levels for occupants of logistics and armored vehicles (Standardization Agreement (NATO) 4569). The specific armor protection level associated with a given vehicle or upgrade is often classified. In order to keep this figure unclassified but still offer the value of a general comparison, specific armor protection levels are omitted, not defined, and not associated with any vehicle in the figure. Data utilized in the comparison was obtained from the National Ground Intelligence Center.

12. Ibid.

13. Gates, p. 7.

9. Cadieu, Maj Trevor, CD, “Canadian Armour in Afghanistan,” Canadian Army Journal, Volume 10. 4, Winter 2008, p. 5.

10. Henderson, LtCol A.M., After-Action Report and Lessons Learned From OEF Phase III, Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned website, available at www.mccll.usmc.mil, 25 September 2008, pp. 24–25.

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Notes

1. Gates, Robert M., “A Balanced Strategy: Re-programming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs web site, available at www.for- eignaffairs.com/articles/63717/robert-m- gates/a-balanced-strategy, January 2009, p. 3.

2. House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, “Hearing on the Expeditionary Fighting Vechi-cle Program, 26 June 2007,” Political/Congres-sional Transcript Wire, 28 June 2007, p. 13.

3. United States Marine Corps, MCOTEA, Infantry Degradation Final Report dated March 2007 and the Water Directional Stability 1 Developmental Test/Operational Test Event Report dated November 2008, Quantico, 2007–08.

4. Feickert, Andrew, “The Marines’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report RS22947, September, December 2008, pp. 5–6.