Marine Corps Gazette

limited to vehicle weight and hull shape but also include hull bottom and troop compartment standoff distances from ground level, hull design (multiple hulls), hull material hardness, crew and embarked troop seating, fire suppression, and spall protection. While restricted to a flat-bottomed hull by the design requirements of a high-speed tracked amphibian, the underbelly survivability design of the EFV has taken this critical approach to integrate proven survivability attributes that provide a combined benefit—given the vehicle’s capability requirements—to the crew and embarked troops. The attributes within the baseline design that most contribute toward underbelly survivability include:

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Increased standoff distance and multiple floor/hull design between the troop compartment and the ground (AAV: 18 inches, EFV: 34 inches).

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Optimally suited aluminum utilized in hull construction.

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Blast attenuating seats for the crew and embarked troops.

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Integrated spall liner.

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Automatic fire extinguishing and suppression system.

The baseline design of the EFV provides underbelly protection that

matches or exceeds that of comparable combat vehicles (M2/M3 baseline, Stryker baseline, LAV– 25). As noted above, these comparable combat vehicles have all pursued survivability upgrades in response to the current mine and IED threat experienced in OEF and OIF. This additional survivability consideration has not been lost on the EFV program.

Leveraging recent vehicle survivability upgrade programs like the U.S. Army’s tank urban survival kit (TUSK) and Bradley urban survival kit (BUSK), a 2007 Marine Corps study was conducted on improving the underbelly protection of the EFV. The study enabled completion and approval of Level A and Level B appliqué belly armor kit designs for the EFV, similar to those underbelly kits produced and fielded for the TUSK and BUSK programs. The kits are designed to be mounted on existing hardware points during sustained operations ashore to counter increased underbelly threats in a conventional or irregular setting. Like other survivability upgrades, the kits add weight (Level B estimated to add 3,640 pounds, 4 percent addition to gross vehicle weight), and for the EFV will require a tradeoff in water capability, currently under examination by the program of-

fice as the appliqué designs are further developed according to the prescribed requirements. However, the improvement in underbelly protection is significant. The Level A kit is expected to match or exceed the upgraded underbelly protection offered to the LAV–25/LAV III and Stryker by their survivability kits, and the Level B kit is expected to match or exceed the upgraded protection offered M2/M3 by the BUSK upgrade kit. (See Figure 2.)

These contemporary threats; the evolution of enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures utilized to employ them; and the spiraling survivability upgrades are indicative of an “action/ reaction” cycle in a relatively static irregular warfare context. Within this context, the characteristics of fixed coalition positions, established and routine lines of communications, and extended time for adversaries to observe and adapt have enabled threats to develop and modify themselves— constantly adapting to remain effective. In the case of the contemporary underbelly threat of IEDs, this action/reaction cycle pushes more survivable vehicles to the battlefield followed by parallel threat development until an overmatch is achieved. The consistent development of overmatching threats is enabled by the given characteristics of this irregular warfare context. A different context, where maneuver is the dominant characteristic, significantly disrupts the ability of overmatch threat development in the action/reaction cycle, especially the ability to accurately position overmatching underbelly threats. Toward the end of his article, Secretary Gates offers the following:

But no one should ever neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare. War is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain. . . . As General William Tecumseh Sherman said, ‘Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster.’