Marine Corps Gazette

While more developed bases are under construction, most positions in the south do not have the amenities that are found in many of the places in Iraq. This goes beyond leisure-related amenities—coffee and ice cream shops and wireless Internet—and extends to contract support for fuel, electricity, billeting, and other kinds of contracted maintenance. Marines need to be prepared to live and operate without contracted support, just like we have for so much of our history.

Counterinsurgency doctrine as outlined in the counterinsurgency field manual (Field Manual 3–24, Marine CorpsWarfighting Publication 33. 3. 5, Counterinsurgency) works in Afghanistan just as it does elsewhere. First, the human environment, not the enemy situation, should be the primary focus. Second, the population must be secured where it lives. Third, the understanding of human

terrain is the critical intelligence requirement.

It is likely that even small units will operate with or adjacent to a non-U.S. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) element. Working with these NATO and ISAF allies brings a unique set of challenges across the warfighting functions. Figure out what additional restrictions they operate under as well as what cultural and tactical differences will impact your combined operations. These include different perceptions about immediate goals and methods relating to influencing the population. Be wary of preconceived notions of our allies’ capabilities and limitations. Those you expect to be good might not be, and those of whom you expect little might surprise you.

There are no silver bullets to the fight in Afghanistan. Marines have built a large base of counterinsurgency experience. Many of the lessons of Al

Anbar do apply to Afghanistan (best outlined in Carter Malkasian and Jerry Meyerle’s article, “How Is Afghanistan Different From Al Anbar?”). ¹That experience, coupled with good application of the doctrinal planning process and the appropriate amount of flexibility, will smooth the transition to a new battlefield. As ever, Marines well schooled in the basics, well disciplined, and with a clear understanding of their task and purpose will succeed.

Note

1. Malkasian, Carter and Jerry Meyerle, draft publication, “How Is Afghanistan Different From Al Anbar?” Center for Naval Analysis, Washington, DC, February 2009, available at www.ena.org/documents/AfghanistanIraq.pdf.