Marine Corps Gazette

trict governor (any of whom may have business or family links to Taliban or criminal elements) are also vying for influence. Determining who has power in each village and district and their individual motivations and relationships is critical. The tribes, subtribes, and villages are remarkably insular. Neighboring villages, even those of the same tribe, may have very little interaction with each other and cannot be expected to share the same interests or support the same groups.

Populationcenters. The population is largely rural, and small villages are spread throughout the deserts and mountains of the south. However, within that rural population there are key centers that have greater access to water and are more densely populated. In Helmand that area is along the Helmand Rud and goes from north of Sangin to south of Garmsir and is several kilometers wide on both sides of the river. While some specialized fighters (like trained mortar men) and senior Taliban leaders on command visits do transit into these populated areas, most of the fighters and lower level insurgent leadership is of, and thus lives among, the population throughout the region. As with the population generally, fighters tend to be concentrated in the more populated areas.

Sectarian differences are not a significant issue. The vast majority of Afghans are Sunni. However, there are ethnic fault lines that may become larger issues. Specifically, the Pashtun majority in the south may respond poorly to a central government that does not include a significant number of Pashtuns in important positions.

The needs of the Afghans in the south are very basic—security, clean water, and a steady food supply. Television and radio networks, vehicles, and even electricity, while mentioned as desirable things, are not usually asked for. Many Afghans still believe we can deliver on our promises—especially U.S. forces. In many villages there is a sense of good will and willingness to work with us.

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have a long way to go. The

ANA are generally better than the ANP, but both still need plenty of work. Most ANA in the south are non-Pashtuns from the central or northern parts of Afghanistan. The ANP are generally local. It is important to keep this in mind when you are getting intelligence from either ANP or ANA. Consider the source, his connection to the community, and his own biases. Like most Afghans, ANSF are usually willing to fight when it is in their interest or when they know they have the tactical advantage. Pashtuns, while not militaristic, are very proud of their warrior heritage and the perception of military skill.

Opium. Poppy is a black market crop. Much insurgent and Taliban activity is criminal activity related to the growing, harvesting, production, and transportation of the poppy and opium derived from it. In Helmand and Farah you will see hundreds of acres of poppy plants. The people growing the poppy are often regular farmers who are growing poppy because it is the best financial choice given the current economic and governmental structure as well as the lack of infrastructure. Because it is a black market crop, criminal and Taliban elements are able to reap monetary benefit from poppy to the point that it is a primary source of financial support for insurgent elements throughout the south.

Terrain is harsh and roads almost nonexistent. Other than a few major paved arteries, most of the roads are nothing more than well-worn dirt trails. There is a very high IED threat on them. This means that traveling off road is common. It takes forever to get anywhere, and the terrain eats up your vehicles. Axles, half shafts, and transmissions are frequently broken. Movements of 50 or 60 kilometers may take a day or more. The medium tactical vehicle replacement is the one vehicle that does well. It has enough power and is durable enough to withstand Afghanistan. The height of the turret also allows gunners to see over the walls surrounding many of the local compounds. Tracked vehicles (both assault amphibious vehicles and tanks) would be extremely useful, as would light armored vehicles. The greater mobility of these vehicles would allow Marines to more easily bypass the IED-laden roads as well as provide additional firepower—much needed in most of southern Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is landlocked, and there are few options for overland transport of goods and material from ports in friendly countries. Because of this, getting supplies and repair parts often takes longer than you may be used to. Living conditions are relatively austere.

ENGINEERS UP! Join Our Inaugural Engineer Community Gathering!

WHO: All service personnel who served with USMC Engineer, Bulk Fuel, Topo or EOD Organizations.

WHEN & WHERE: 20-25 Oct. 2010 Alexandria, VA

WHY: We’re especially desirous of having all engineer and other related associations plan their reunions to co-locate with us at the “Crossroads of our Corps.”