Marine Corps Gazette

tions, as well as the local populace, to ensure that warnings are provided early enough to coordinate responses.

EMAC is important for tactical/operational-level success. (Photo by LCpl Monty Burton.)

an adversary who wishes to conduct an attack, sabotage equipment or facilities, or collect intelligence. Ensuring that a detailed CI plan is included in the mission planning and execution can identify, neutralize, and/or minimize the threat to deployed forces.

In a post-Afghanistan/Iraq world, the Marine Corps plans to shift to development of security cooperation Marine air-ground task forces (SC MAGTFs) as outlined in the 2008 operational employment concept, The Long War—Send in the Marines. The SC MAGTF will “conduct security cooperation missions over a dispersed area while having the ability to be redeployed for crisis response . . . to meet theater engagement requirements.” While these missions will depend on combatant commander priorities, the

security situation, and existing nation partnerships, several assumptions can be made, including that the deployment of Marines will be in company-sized or below units, Marines will not be billeted on U.S. bases thus relying on the host nation for security, partnered nations will be in the geographic proximity to countries experiencing conflict or instability and, most importantly, the Marines will be considered soft targets by terrorists, hostile intelligence services, and other adversaries. The numerous intelligence and security requirements for the SC MAGTF will require different support from what we are now looking at as traditional (read HumInt-only) CI/HumInt operations. Relationships must be built—and maintained—with host-nation security personnel and organiza-

The Way Ahead

The threat from terrorists, hostile intelligence services, and foreign actors is everywhere. While domestically, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service conducts strategic CI to protect the Navy and Marine Corps, CI/HumInt Marines deploy with Marine forces to conduct CI support. Both Afghanistan and Iraq possess borders with U.S. adversaries who have conducted—and will continue to conduct—activities to influence and disrupt U.S. and coalition operations, as well as the fledgling governments of these two countries. In the Far East, hostile intelligence services continuously observe U.S. military exercises to learn of emerging capabilities and future plans. Globally, we see emerging alliances and trade occurring with China and Russia, which must be continually watched.

As noted in the Joint Publication 1–02 definition, CI is an intelligence “function.” It must be consciously and systematically brought into any operational planning. Commanders and their staffs must realize that their commands, their operations, and their Marines are constant targets of hostile intelligence services—in garrison, while deployed, and even when in contact. These adversaries continuously probe our organizational, operational, and personal vulnerabilities. They can conduct espionage, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism in any Marine Corps battlespace, liberty port, or overseas training areas, and conducting CI activities can identify and counteract this threat, but it needs a commander’s support. Following terrorist attacks, pundits often refer to an intelligence or operational security failure; however, not identifying and neutralizing a terrorist attack before it occurs is a CI failure and, therefore, a failure of command.