Combat Operations
In Afghanistan and Iraq, HumInt
collection has enabled the capture of
innumerable insurgents and terrorists,
facilitated discovery of thousands of
weapons caches, and prevented many
attacks. HumInt successes have solidified the importance of this kind of information to commanders. However,
while the value of HumInt can be
measured, it is more difficult to “prove”
the effect of a good CI plan and its denial of information and access to an adversary. Most commanders and their
staffs are familiar with the use of
CI/HumInt Marines in their HumInt
role but may not be familiar with the
full spectrum of CI capabilities and the
importance of conducting CI activities
and analysis.
During planning of maneuver warfare, a CI reduction plan is critical to
identify which military, government,
civilian, and industrial targets should
be secured and exploited for opera-
tional or strategic intelligence purposes. Examples may include offices
of the national intelligence agency,
local police forces, government buildings, critical manufacturing or raw
material facilities, newspaper and
printing plants, or radio and television
broadcasting stations. When U.S.
forces took control of Baghdad in
2003, the international media reported Iraqis looting the Mukhabarat
(Iraqi National Intelligence Service)
headquarters, which in hindsight
should have been immediately secured
as a CI target.
Most often in combat operations,
the priority of effort will be to collect
actionable information through source
operations, debriefings, and interrogations (HumInt). However, when the
question “how reliable is this information?” is asked, it will produce an answer based on analysis of the source’s
body language and motivation, the
likelihood of the information, and even
some gut instinct. This is why when
time and the operational situation
allow, the conduct of CI activities can
help determine the reliability of information sources and identify other CI
influences in the area of operations.
The bad guy on the battlefield may not
be a man with a gun pointed at
Marines. Adversaries may coerce local
nationals to provide disinformation,
lead U.S. forces into an ambush, attempt to influence military operations,
or undermine the host-nation government within the battlespace—each of
which can be just as dangerous to the
Marines and the mission.
Noncombat Operations
In recent years the Corps has found
itself conducting not just combat and
counterinsurgency operations, but humanitarian assistance/disaster relief,
peacekeeping, and even training and
engagement missions. During these
missions, Marines are “soft targets” for
Predeployment training for individual operators
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able to function prior to
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Operator Courses
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