error will be identified and corrected
quickly. In the current system, where
intelligence information products are
generated by the hundreds, an erroneous piece of information can persist
for months hidden in products generated by various headquarters. A common intelligence information database
will bring the added advantage of a de-facto system of version control. Identification of old information and
generation of collections taskings to
update outdated or missing information will be obvious. In the current system, information is so fragmented that
an analyst cannot even know if he has
the most up-to-date information without a time-consuming research and
verification effort.
Like any reorganization, the adjustment period will be painful and the argument will be made that a more
organized intelligence information
framework amounts to “
micromanage-ment” and limits subordinate initiative.
But the Marine Corps has standardized
systems to manage training, readiness,
administrative, and logistical information for good reason. More efficient processing of intelligence information will
allow us to make better use of intelligence personnel and enhance our efficiency even as the community expands.
Beyond OIF: Current and Future Expeditionary Operations
As the Marine Corps slowly reduces
its footprint in Iraq but increases expeditionary presence in support of the
“long war,” intelligence, combat arms,
and support units will continue to collect, process, and analyze information
that no other U.S. intelligence entities
have access to. Security cooperation
MAGTFs, Marine expeditionary units,
and foreign military training units will
all gather valuable information regarding personalities, events, infrastructure,
and networks. We can also expect that
concepts, such as distributed operations and enhanced company operations, will increasingly lead to small
units operating independently of traditional intelligence support structures.
These scenarios will require efficient
processing and capture of every piece
of information we collect in order to
build a knowledge base for potential
future operations and to enable current
operations. These scenarios will punish
haphazard intelligence information
management with lost tempo and lost
opportunities.
Another benefit of a more standardized information management system
is that it allows intelligence sections to
train to manage information. If the information management system was relatively standard across the Marine
Corps, intelligence sections could prepare to implement an information
management scheme prior to entering
an operational environment vice having to spend the initial months of a deployment adjusting to an unfamiliar
. . . information is so
fragmented that an analyst cannot even know
if he has the most up-to-dateinformation. . . .
information management system. In a
future contingency environment,
where a unit’s presence may be of short
duration and characterized by high operational tempo, it will be important
that intelligence sections have established and trained to information management systems prior to crossing the
line of departure.
Though there is much room for improvement, MarineLink and Intel
Tracker are the most promising initiatives to provide a systematic software
framework for a global, Corps-wide intelligence information management
system. They are adaptable and with
continued improvements can serve as
an information management tool
across the full spectrum of conflict in
both sustained and contingency operations. But making these systems work
to serve the bottom-up intelligence
needs associated with successful expeditionary operations requires the Marine Corps to adopt a more organized
approach to managing our intelligence
information. This in turn requires
some top-down standardization to our
intelligence information management
standing operating procedures and
training.
Of course, if the Marine Corps is
successful in creating an intelligence information management system, it leads
to the question of how to integrate a
Corps-wide information management
architecture into joint and national
databases. The answer probably lies in
replicating the same processes it takes
to put our own “house” in order. Regardless, effectively fixing our own intelligence information management
system will enhance the Corps’ effectiveness as an expeditionary force in
readiness and will enhance our ability
to feed intelligence into national systems in support of the long war.
Notes
1. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication2, Intelligence, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 5.
2. Ibid., p. 41.
3. Ibid., p. 8.
4. Training and Education Command MarineLink instructional materials may be found at
https://www.intranet.tecom.usmc.mil/sites/mci
s/focusareas/cic/referance%20material/forms/all
items.aspx, accessed 17 April 2008.
5. Ibid.
6. “Global Intelligence Challenges in the
1990s,” American Intelligence Journal, Winter
1989–1990, p. 38.
7. Ibid.
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