taken college-level courses in math, science, and history. Although this may be
true of some, it is unlikely that the majority or even a significant portion of
NCOs took these classes. Marine
NCOs, however, are exposed to a large
amount of knowledge that was only
taught in college during the 1950s.
Therefore, on a rudimentary level,
NCOs are recipients of a liberal education as envisioned by Huntington.
In addition to having a liberal education, Huntington suggests that military professionals must use that
education to advance their profession.
Military professionals engage in doctrinal development; create and refine tactics, techniques, and procedures; and
collect and disseminate lessons learned
during operations and training. 10
NCOs, for the most part, have taken a
leading role in the latter two functions.
As evidence, one only has to glance
through the back issues of the Marine
Corps Gazette. Combat hardened
NCOs are writing about their experiences in an attempt to improve the infantry.
NCOs have not participated in the
former function—doctrinal develop-
ment. The decentralized battlefield requires squad leaders and fire team leaders to make strategic-level decisions
and execute those decisions beyond any
officer’s observation. Officers, therefore, do not know exactly what is happening at the squad and fire team
levels. They may infer or hypothesize
to conceptualize this experience, but
except in special circumstances, officers
do not participate in this lower level action. The disconnect between officers
and NCOs is imposed by the reality of
the situation and not by any flaw in
military hierarchy or organizational
charts. NCOs must be active participants in doctrine formation in order
for doctrine to remain pragmatic and
effective. Currently, junior officers and
NCOs are solicited to contribute but
not be an integral part of doctrine development. One reason for this is that
most NCOs are not familiar with Marine Corps doctrine.
Only a handful of squad leaders and
fire team leaders have heard of Marine
Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP
1), Warfighting, and MCDP 1–3,
Tactics. Even worse is that most platoon
sergeants and platoon commanders
only have limited experiences with the
two and have not made a detailed
study of either. The current Marine
Corps PME system is deficient in dealing with their teaching. Marine Corps
Institute courses do not promote the
indepth and critical thinking necessary
for their breakdown and understanding. How can NCOs participate in
doctrine development if they do not
know it exists? The answer is they cannot. 11
It is crucial for NCOs to read these
publications, understand them, and internalize their guidance. For example,
during the November 2004 battle of
Fallujah, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines
fought an asymmetrical enemy that
used a variety of tactics and techniques.
These tactics and techniques were not
fully anticipated prior to the assault on
the city. This situation forced individual Marines, fire team leaders, and
squad leaders to be creative, to improvise, and to adapt to an ever-changing
tactical environment. They accomplished the mission and learned
through trial and error important principles and concepts that forever guided
their tactical decisions. 12 Most of these
