Marine Corps Gazette

violence, just as none of the specialists aiding the medical profession is capable of the diagnosis and treatment of illness.” For instance, a logistician’s primary duty does not include finding more effective methods to fight an infantry platoon but does determine the most efficient means for supplying that platoon. This does not mean the logistician is not professional. Nor does it suggest that a logistician faced with a combat situation would crumble under fire. It does mean, however, that the logistician’s specialty is not the management of violence; therefore, the logistician is not a military professional. Similarly, enlisted artillerymen, assault amphibious vehicle crewmen, and combat engineers are more “ technicians.” They support the infantry and usually are placed under the direction of the supported infantry commander whether he is an officer or staff NCO. Collectively, they do not fall into Huntington’s categorization of a military professional. ⁵

Huntington’s seminal book was written when the draft was still in place, the Cold War was in its most heated phase, and the images of massed armies clashing in epic battles were seared into the memory of all Americans. Both the military and the enemies of the United States have drastically changed since Huntington’s writing. Why is Huntington’s book still influential when discussing the idea of professional military forces? The reason is that his conceptual framework is still valid. Huntington’s three characteristics of military professionalism are still used as the metric to gauge whether a military force is professional. In the U.S. military, the group of military professionals has grown beyond Huntington’s limited claim that officers are its exclusive constituents. There is no doubt that 21st century NCOs, specifically U.S. Marine Corps infantry NCOs, fit Huntington’s criteria.

Marine infantry NCOs demonstrate expertise as indicated by their level of experience, training, and education. Most Marine infantry NCOs have completed at least one, most likely two, combat

tours to either Iraq or Afghanistan. They experienced combat in urban, suburban, desert, and mountainous terrains. They participated in the full spectrum of 21st century warfare by conducting combat, counterinsurgency, and humanitarian operations. The current redeployment of Marines from Al Anbar, Iraq to Afghanistan is introducing a new cohort of Marines to a wholly different fighting environment, thus furthering their level of experience. The training of infantry NCOs has improved exponentially since the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003. The revamped Squad Leaders Course, Exercise MOJAVE VIPER, close combat marksmanship courses, increased realistic training programs, and modernized professional military education (PME) courses all have produced an infantry NCO prepared for the 21st century “three block war.”

The responsibility of Marine NCOs has increased rapidly in recent years. The nature of the counterinsurgency fight in Iraq and Afghanistan forces officers to trust their enlisted subordinates with the execution of missions that impact national-level strategy and policy. This is a profound development predicted by Gen Charles C. Krulak in 1999 when he wrote about the emergence of the “strategic corporal.” ⁶The tasks currently given to Marine infantry NCOs were traditionally carried out by officers. With these tasks comes the inherent responsibility for their completion. Before Iraq and Afghanistan, infantry NCOs were not entrusted with the responsibility of managing violence on the scale now thought commonplace. In “ Distributed Operations: Is the Marine Corps Ready?” then-Maj Michael D. Grice argues for NCOs to be “empowered to make the decisions necessary to leverage the strengths of the MAGTF [Marine air-ground task force] over the enemy.” ⁷Grice suggests there is a need for more responsibility to be placed upon small unit leaders and that this is the future trend in Marine Corps battle leadership. No other Service relies more upon its NCO corps. For infantry NCOs, the responsibility re-

quirement for Huntington’s professionals is fulfilled.

Marine NCOs continually maintain a sense of corporateness, or collective identity, unknown to most branches of the Armed Forces. It is well known throughout the Marine Corps that NCOs are its backbone. Marine NCOs are the only NCOs authorized to carry a sword—a tradition that signifies their segregation from both officers and enlisted non-NCOs. There is a spiritual transition in a Marine’s career when the blood stripes are “pinned on.” Upon promotion, a lance corporal enters into a select group filled with its own tradition and folklore. This imagined collective identity clearly signifies that corporateness is present among Marine NCOs.

There are, however, two areas where Marine NCOs do not match the criteria set forth by Huntington. The first is the length of service. Huntington argues that a military professional can only be considered a professional if he stays in for an entire career. Most Marine NCOs do not remain in the Marine Corps beyond their first enlistment. But those who make the Marine Corps a career would be considered, according to Huntington, military professionals. The second criterion where Marine infantry NCOs are lacking is education. Huntington argues that a liberal education (a liberal arts college degree) is an essential element in being labeled a military professional. The vast majority of Marine infantry NCOs do not have college degrees. A liberal education broadens the mind and allows for the military professional to adapt quickly to situations needing a depth and breadth of knowledge in math, science, history, and the human condition. ⁸

Public education has changed significantly since the 1950s when Huntington wrote The Soldier andthe State. The introduction of standards-based education and research-based educational innovations exponentially increased the amount of material taught to students. ⁹It is not uncommon for a student upon graduation from high school to have