made it to the press, and even the story
in the December 2008 Marine Corps
Timesnoted how “the Marines involved
in the battle have asked for privacy and
the Corps has agreed.” This is understandable, as humility is normally part
of any genuine hero’s character. The
problem with this type of silence is that
the American public feeds off of good
news such as this, and public support at
home remains critical to campaign success. Yes, some of the Iwo Jima flag raisers were uncomfortable with the
attention they received during their
War Bonds tour, and being a “quiet
professional” has its time and place, to
be sure. But despite the awkwardness,
our Nation needs heroes to believe in
(witness the U.S. Airways “miracle on
the Hudson” response), and the Marine
Corps could do much better at telling
its own story. This generation needs its
Audie Murphys too; our combat public
relations must improve.
Commission a Marine Corps
Afghanistan/Pakistan Study Group, in
the same vein that President George W.
Bush created the Iraq Study Group.
However, rather than querying senior
leaders and civilian “experts,” ask our
corporals and captains what they think.
“Centers of excellence,” such as Marine
Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1, Marine Corps Training and Operations Group, and Marine Air-Ground Task Force Staff Training
Program, could join forces to supervise
such an effort. Our junior leaders
who’ve been in theater often have the
best ideas, and the successful “surge” in
Iraq was really just an overdue application of the concepts put forth for years
by some of our smart young officers
and enlisted Marines closest to the
gunfire. Lend these strategic corporals
and battle captains our ear as we work
our way into a new Afghanistan plan.
Training
As DESERT TALON closes its doors,
MOJAVE VIPER25 switches sets, and
training moves from the deserts to the
mountains, tactics, techniques, and
procedures should be energetically refined and improved to meet the additional demands of Afghanistan.
Marines and soldiers from private to
general with experience in both regions
have commented on how much more
difficult the Afghan environment is,
with its rugged mountains and high altitude, it’s lack of infrastructure, and its
history of armed conflict and local
fighters with years of combat experience. Even back in May 2006, Marines
who had clashed with the Taliban were
asking their Corps to improve training
for units deploying to that region. 26
Let’s give them what they want and deserve.
Marine Corps Systems Command
should immediately review all Iraq-re-lated training contracts. It takes many
months and often years for “good
ideas” to be translated into training systems on our bases and stations, and we
should stop the Iraqi train now so we
can make sure everyone successfully
